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Employment Discrimination-Wright v. Olin Corp.: Title VII
and the Exclusion of Women from the Fetally Toxic
Workplace
During the past decade, women have altered dramatically this country's
workforce by entering the job market at an estimated rate of two million per
year.' This increase in the number of women workers has been accompanied
by an increase in the awareness of reproductive hazards 2 associated with expo-
sure to certain chemicals 3 in the workplace. Although future generations also
may be at risk through the effects of reproductive hazards on male workers,
4
employers have singled out women as most susceptible to these hazards.5 In an
effort to protect the fetus from harm and themselves from possible tort liabil-
ity,6 a growing number of employers have adopted policies excluding fertile
women from positions in toxic work environments. 7
The situation giving rise to such exclusionary policies is fraught with ethi-
cal, social, and legal dilemmas. Although exclusionary policies may serve so-
1. Nothstein & Ayres, Sex-Based Considerations ofDiffierentiation in the Workplace.: Explor-
ing the Biomedical Interface Between OSH4 and Title VII, 26 VILL L. REV. 239, 241 (1981).
2. Finneran, Title VII and Restrictions on Employment o/Fertile Women, 31 LAD. L.J. 223
(1980); Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implicationsfor the Employment Rights
of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV, 798 (1981); Hricko, Social Policy Considerations of Occupational
Health Standards: The Example of Lead and Reproductive Effects, 7 PREVENTIVE MED, 398
(1978). Preliminary evidence collected by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs indicates that ap-
proximately twenty million jobs involve exposure to reproductive hazards. 45 Fed. Reg. 7514
(1980).
3. These chemicals can be classified according to their effect on human reproductive
processes. Mutagens can alter the genetic structure of reproductive cells in both males and fe-
males; such alterations can result in birth defects that may be passed on to future generations.
Gametotoxins can limit the fertility of either sex by reducing or damaging the sperm and ova.
Teratogens damage the fetus directly by passing through the mother's placenta; damage may oc-
cur before the mother is even aware that she is pregnant. Certain substances may have mutagenic,
gametotoxic, and teratogenic characteristics. Only if a toxin can be classified exclusively as a
teratogen will the threat of reproductive harm be limited to women. See Howard, supra note 2, at
802-06; Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices in Hazardous Industries: Protection or Discrini-
nation? 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 97, 99-100 (1978).
4. See supra note 3. Even if the only hazardous substance in the workplace is a teratogen,
male workers may endanger fetuses carried by their wives if the wife is exposed to the substance
carried on the husband's clothes, shoes, or hair. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus:
The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69
GEo. L.J. 641, 657 (1981).
5. This practice may be due to traditional notions regarding women's primary function as
childbearer. Note, supra note 3, at 97 n. 1. Also, most scientific research has focused almost exclu-
sively on teratogenic effects. See Williams, supra note 4, at 661.
6. See Williams, supra note 4, at 644-46. See also infra notes 185-98 and accompanying
text.
7. Companies excluding women from jobs involving exposure to toxic chemicals include
American Cyanamid Co., Environmental Protection & Aeration Systems, Inc., General Motors
Corp., St. Joe Minerals Corp., Dow Chemical Co., Monsanto, Firestone, and B.F. Goodrich Co.
See Williams, supra note 4, at 642 n.l 1; Howard, supra note 2, at 798 n.3. Interestingly, no at-
tempts to exclude fertile women from toxic work environments in industries in which female
workers predominate have been reported; only male dominated industries have adopted exclu-
sionary policies. Id.
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ciety's unquestionable interest in the health of future generations8 as well as
satisfy the employer's common-law duty to the fetus9 (which in turn serves the
employer's interest in profitability through avoidance of tort liability), these
policies inevitably conffict with the national objective of equal employment
opportunity mandated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 In an
effort to reconcile the competing interests of fetal health and a fertile woman's
right to work, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) n1
and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams (OFCCP), in consultation with the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA), t2 issued draft interpretive guidelines' 3 for employers
considering exclusionary policies. After receiving much criticism, however,
the agencies withdrew the guidelines, concluding that the most appropriate
method of eliminating employment discrimination in industries concerned
about reproductive hazards is through investigation and enforcement of the
law on a case-by-case basis.' 4 Left without any guidance for resolving the
competing interests of the fetus and the fertile woman who wishes to work in a
fetally toxic environment, the Fourth Circuit in Wright v. Olin Corp. 15 became
the first court of appeals16 to apply this case-by-case analysis.
Olin was the result of an appeal 17 from a judgment for defendant Olin in
8. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,446 (1977) (reasonable for state to further "unquestionably
strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154
(1973) (state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health and in protecting po-
tential life).
9. See Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) (child
born alive after sustaining prenatal tortious injury has cause of action); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527,
458 P.2d 617 (1969) (cause of action exists for wrongful death of unborn fetus); W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 336-38 (4th ed. 1971); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liabilityfor the
Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
11. Congress created the EEOC as part of Title VII and delegated to it the primary responsi-
bility for preventing and eliminating the unlawful employment practices defined in Title VII.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2391, 2401. The EEOC is directed to cooperate with other departments and agencies when per-
forming its educational and promotional activities. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2391, 2404.
12. Congress set up OSHA to administer the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976), and gave it the power to set standards necessary to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment. Id § 654(a)(2).
13. Interpretative Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards, 45
Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980).
14. 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981).
15. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
16. Two cases involving policies excluding women of childbearing ability have not
progressed beyond the district court. Litigation is pending in Christman v. American Cyanamid
Co., No. 80-0024-P (N.D.W. Va., filed May 20, 1980). In Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 484 F.
Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979), the court avoided analysis of the exclusionary policy under Title VII
by determining that plaintiff had not shown irreparable injury. Id. at 325. Plaintiff merely had
been moved to a lower level position without loss of pay. Id. at 321.
17. Olin was a consolidated appeal of two complex employment discrimination actions,
EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646 (W.D.N.C. 1980), and Wright v. Olin
Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1615 (W.D.N.C. 1980), a class action. Plaintiffs charged
Olin with discrimination in its recruitment, hiring, job assignments, promotions, terminations,
reemployment, and seniority system. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1176. Olin won both cases in district court.
Only EEOC v. Olin Corp. addressed the fetal vulnerability issue.
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an action brought by the EEOC pursuant to its authority under Title VII.18
The EEOC challenged Olin's "female employment and fetal vulnerability pro-
gram."' 9 This program created three job classifications for women, each clas-
sification corresponding to the level of exposure to chemicals in different areas,
and flatly excluded women of childbearing capacity from certain positions.
20
No similar restrictions were placed on men; they merely received a warning
required by OSHA concerning the potentially adverse reproductive effects of
lead exposure.2
1
The district court found that "the policy was instituted for sound medical
and humane reasons and is based upon sound medical knowledge and re-
search and years of monitoring of levels of chemical exposure at Olin's
plant."'22 The court further found that Olin's policy "was not instituted...
with the intent or purpose to discriminate against females because of their
sex .... [Instead,] the purpose [was] to protect the unborn fetus at a time
when it is most vulnerable to exposure to harmful chemicals."' 23 In applying
these findings, the district court determined that the exclusionary policy did
not violate Title VII, but the court failed to subject the policy to a traditional
Title VII analysis.24 It may be inferred, however, that the court relied on a
covert disparate treatment analysis, given its emphasis on the legitimate, non-
discriminatory nature of Olin's policy.2 5
The Fourth Circuit determined that the proof scheme developed for cov-
ert disparate treatment was "wholly inappropriate" for assessing the legality of
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The section relates to the enforcement of Title VII. Once an alleg-
edly aggrieved party files a charge with the EEOC, the EEOC must notify the employer of the
charge and conduct an investigation. If at least two of the five members of the EEOC find reason-
able cause for crediting the charge, the EEOC must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory prac-
tice through conciliation efforts with the employer. If the EEOC is unsuccessful in procuring an
agreement with the employer within thirty days after the charge was filed, it may bring its own
civil action against the employer within ninety days. If the EEOC does not file an action within
that time, the aggrieved party may bring an action if at least one member of the EEOC so autho-
rizes. Id See also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2404-05.
19. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1182.
20. Id. A "restricted" job is one that "may require contact with and exposure to known or
suspected abortifacient or teratogenic agents." Id. Such a job is not available to women unless
they can prove they are sterile and will not sustain other physical harm from the environment. A
"controlled" job is one in which contact with harmful chemicals is limited. Pregnant women may
work in "controlled" areas only after an individual evaluation, and are encouraged to seek trans-
fers. Nonpregnant women capable of childbearing may hold "controlled" jobs only after signing
a form stating that they recognize that the job presents "some risk, although slight." An "un-
restricted" job does not present a hazard to pregnant women or their fetuses; any woman may
work in an unrestricted area. Id.
21. Id.
22. EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646, 1659 (W.D.N.C. 1980).
Three Olin employees testified about the necessity of such a policy to protect unborn fetuses and
their mothers. They were not experts in the field, however, and were unable to identify any arti-
cles or journals supporting their conclusions. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1182.
23. EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646, 1659 (W.D.N.C. 1980).
24. For a discussion of the analytic frameworks that have developed under Title VII doc-
trine, see infra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
25. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1186 n.22. Covert disparate treatment analysis is used for policies that
are mere pretexts for discrimination. For a discussion of the covert disparate treatment theory for
analyzing Title VII claims and defenses, see infra notes 51-53 & 61-64 and accompanying text.
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the fetal vulnerability program.26 The court vacated the district court's opin-
ion regarding Olin's exclusionary policy and remanded the case with direc-
tions to determine additional facts and apply different legal principles.27 After
noting that no theory under Title VII applied precisely to Olin's policy,28 the
court determined that the disparate impact-business necessity theory29 was the
most appropriate conceptual framework for analysis of the fetal vulnerability
program.30 The court noted that plaintiffs arguably had stated a claim of
overt discrimination.31 It nevertheless refused to recognize the overt discrimi-
nation-bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) theory of claim and de-
fense32 as exclusively applicable because, if properly applied, it would deny
the employer the opportunity to justify its policy under the wider scope of the
business necessity defense. 33 Noting that the bfoq defense "obviously" could
not be established, the court held that the employer should not be "forced" to
attempt to do so. 34
The court characterized fetal protection as a valid business concern. It
determined that the safety of unborn children is more analogous to the safety
of customers than to the safety of workers. 35 Although workers usually have
an absolute right to be free from discriminatory regulations that concern their
own exposure to workplace hazards,3 6 the employer ordinarily is allowed to
regulate its workers' performance or presence, even through discriminatory
means, when the customers' safety is at risk.37 The Court concluded that the
business necessity defense may be available to an employer with a fetal vul-
nerability program because of society's interest in protecting the health of un-
born children.38 The court held that to establish a business necessity defense,
26. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1185 & n.20. The court noted that the "special feature of [that] proof
scheme [is] its threshold presumption to aid proof of the claimed intent to 'treat less favorably'
that is provided precisely because that intent is denied, is not manifest, and can only be proved
circumstantially." Id. In Olin, the claim was that the intent was manifest in the nature of the
program and the defense was not aimed at denying or rebutting the claim of intent but at justify-
ing it. Id.
27. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1176.
28. Id. at 1185.
29. This analysis is used to evaluate policies that are facially neutral but have a dispropor-
tionately adverse effect on a protected class of employees (e.g., women, blacks, and Indians). See
infra notes 54-56 & 65-68 and accompanying text.
30. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1185.
31. Id. at 1186 n.21. Overt discrimination occurs when a policy is based explicitly on race,
color, sex, national origin, or religion. For a discussion of overt discrimination, see infra notes 48-
50 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the bfoq defense, see infra notes 58-60 & 69-92 and accompanying
text.
33. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21.
34. Id. at 1186 n.21.
35. Id. at 1189. The court gave no reason for its conclusion other than summarily stating that
"[c]ertainly the safety of unborn children of workers would seem no less a matter of legitimate
business concern than the safety of the traditional business licensee or invitee upon an employer's
premises." Id.
36. See infra note 76.
37. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1188-89. See infra notes 91, 107 & text accompanying note 181.
38. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1189-90 & n.26. The court stated that the societal interest was so com-
pelling that it was unnecessary to consider the employer's economic interest in avoiding potential
liablity to damaged fetuses. Thus, as far as the court was concerned, it was irrelevant that avoid-
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Olin must prove: (1) that toxic hazards in the work environment pose signifi-
cant risks of harm to fetuses; 39 (2) that "on the best available scientific data"40
the risks are substantially limited to women workers (i e., that there is no risk
of harm to the unborn children of men workers);41 and (3) that the exclusion-
ary policy effectively protects fetuses of women workers. 42 Even if Olin could
satisfy this business necessity test, the court held that the district court should
rule against Olin if the claimant could prove that acceptable alternative prac-
tices would achieve the purpose as effectively as the exclusionary policy with a
less discriminatory'impact on fertile women.43
To determine the propriety of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Olin and its
ramifications for exclusionary policies and Title VII doctrine, one must under-
stand the analytic framework that has developed under Title VII. Of particu-
lar importance is the application of the various theories to sex discrimination;
specifically, discrimination based on pregnancy and childbearing capacity.
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate
"artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" 44 by prohibit-
ing discrimination on the basis of race, sex,4 5 color, religion, or national ori-
gin.46 Two theories of discrimination have developed under Title VII:
disparate treatment and disparate impact.47 An employer can violate Title VII
ance of liability and economic loss may not be enough to constitute a business necessity. Id. at
1190 n.26.
39. Id. at 1190.
40. Id. at n.27.
41. Id. at 1190 & n.27.
42. Id. at 1190. The court adapted the proof scheme for the business necessity defense that it
had formulated in Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (facially neutral seniority
system with disparate racial impact), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). For further discussion
of Robinson, see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
43. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1191.
44. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1977).
45. Ironically, "sex" as a proscribed basis for discrimination can be credited to a staunch
opponent of the Civil Rights Bill. On the last day that the bill was debated in the House, Repre-
sentative Smith of Virginia proposed an amendment including "sex" in the array of prohibited
classifications, partially to ridicule the bill, but mainly to destroy its chances of passing. 110 CONG.
REc. 2577 (1964). To his dismay, the bill was enacted as amended.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(l) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
47. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977):
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, al-
though it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment. Undoubtedly, disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII .... Claims of disparate treatment may be distin-
guished from claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.
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under the disparate treatment theory in two ways. First, he may explicitly
treat a protected class differently from others (overt discrimination).48 For ex-
ample, an employer who flatly refuses to hire women, for whatever reason, is
guilty per se of overt discrimination. 49 Proof of discriminatory intent is re-
quired. Because intent is implicit in the employer's policy of classifying em-
ployees or potential employees, however, this burden is easily met.50 Second,
an employer may discriminate intentionally but covertly against a protected
class (covert disparate treatment).5 1 In this situation, the employer's different
treatment of a member of a protected class allegedly is based on a reason other
than membership in that class, but that reason is only a pretext for intentional
discrimination. 52 Proof of discriminatory motive is essential for holding an
employer guilty of covert disparate treatment, since it is not facially apparent
that the employer's act violates Title VII.53
Under the disparate impact theory, an employer violates Title VII by
adopting a policy that does not differentiate on the basis of class, but nonethe-
less has a disproportionate, adverse effect on a class protected by Title VII
(disparate impact).54 For example, an employer who sets minimum height
and weight requirements for applicants may prevent a disproportionate
number of females from being considered for hire; such a policy would prima
facie violate Title VII.5 5 Proof of discriminatory intent is not required in dis-
Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact
theory.
48. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716 (1977)
(employer's practice of deducting larger sums from female's paycheck than from male's paychecks
for contribution to pension is facially discriminatory).
49. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1969)
(employer refused to hire female applicant for switchman position because job too strenuous for
women).
50. See Williams, supra note 4, at 669 n.176.
51. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (employer may
have used illegal conduct as pretext for racial motive when deciding not to rehire black employee).
52. An example of how plaintiff may prove a prima facie case of discrimination is found in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In that case, plaintiff established a
prima facie case by showing: (I) that he belonged to a protected class (race); (2) that he applied for
and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that his appli-
cation was denied despite his qualifications; and (4) that the employer continued to seek appli-
cants with similar qualifications. Id. at 802. As noted in Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 575 (1978), the evidence necessary to demonstrate disparate treatment will vary from case to
case.
53. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court stated that "in the
absence of proof of pretext or discriminatory application of [employer's asserted] reason [for his
treatment of claimant], this cannot be thought the kind of 'artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary
barriers to employment' which the Court found to be the intention of Congress to remove." Id at
806 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1979)). Discriminatory motive ordina-
rily is proven with circumstantial evidence. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW 13-15 (2d ed. 1983). Examples of such circumstantial evidence include the
employer's treatment of other classes in similar situations; the employer's treatment of the claim-
ant(s) during employment; and the employer's general policy and practice with respect to minority
employment, which may be shown through statistics. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
54. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (policy of not
hiring methadone users a prima facie violation of Title VII because disproportionate number of
blacks and Hispanics excluded from consideration).
55. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (prima facie case established when
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parate impact cases because the consequences of the facially neutral policy
constitute the violation.56
Traditionally, each claim of discrimination has been associated with a
distinct defense.57 If an employer is faced with a prima facie case of overt
discrimination, it ordinarily must prove that religion, sex, or national origin is
a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise. s58 This is the only avail-
able defense to a claim of overt, class-based discrimination contemplated by
plaintiffshowed facially neutral standards-here, that applicant be at least 5'2" and 120 pounds-
were used to select applicants for hire in significantly discriminatory pattern).
56. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1970): "[G]ood intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures ... that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups. . . .Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation."
57. The Supreme Court's analysis in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), indicates
that the defenses available to an employer are separate and distinct and traditionally apply to
different types of Title VII claims. In Dothard the Court considered only the bfoq defense, see
infra note 58, in reviewing a policy that explicitly discriminated against women and only the
business necessity defense, see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text, for the employer's
facially neutral policy. See also Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1980) ("BFOQ is a
warrant for affirmative, deliberate discrimination while a BND [business necessity defense] is a
defense to the prima facie case made when an apparently neutral employment practice is shown to
have discriminatory effect"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 674 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1980) ("BFOQ defense is applicable to employment
practices that purposefully discriminate on the basis of sex while the Business Necessity defense in
appropriately raised where facially neutral employment practices run afoul of Title VII only be-
cause of their disparate impact"); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086
n.
8 (8th Cir.) (overtly discriminatory employment practice violates Title VII unless there is a bfoq;
facially neutral employment policy discriminatory in practice justified only if it meets judicially
created business necessity test), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
633 F.2d 361, 369-70 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (noting trial court's confusion over whether bfoq or
business necessity should be applied to claim of disparate impact; citing Dothard for proposition
that clear disparate impact will be tested by business necessity and clear disparate treatment by
bfoq), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). Nonetheless, the lower courts have not applied the corre-
sponding claims and defenses consistently. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 546 F.
Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (citing Garcia for distinction between bfoq and business necessity
defenses, but stating that "[a]lthough the present case involves an affirmative, deliberate discrimi-
nation rather than a neutral employment practice with a discriminatory effect, the court will, nev-
ertheless, address the business necessity defense as well as the [bfoq] defense"); Maclennan v.
American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1977) (policy giving rise to claim of disparate
impact assessed under bfoq and business necessity defenses); In re National Airlines, 434 F. Supp.
249, 259 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (bfoq defense applied to claim of disparate impact), aff'dper curiarn, 700
F.2d 695 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
The Fourth Circuit indicated in Olin that it would allow an employer to advance a business
necessity defense in response to a prima facie case of overt discrimination. See Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185-86 n.21 (4th Cir. 1982). For a criticism of this position see infra notes
162-76 and accompanying text.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1976). In full, the section provides:
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (I) it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employ-
ment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization
to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an
employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling appren-
ticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in
any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
It is important for purposes of later analysis that Congress did not extend the bfoq exception
to discriminatory practices based on race. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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Congress;5 9 it is also the most difficult of the three Title VII defenses to
establish.60
When charged with covert disparate treatment an employer must articu-
late a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the challenged action.61 This
is not a heavy burden; 62 it is necessary only for the employer to raise a suffi-
cient issue of fact about its intention to discriminate against plaintiff, not to
persuade the court that it actually was motivated by the reason it articulates. 63
The ultimate burden of persuasion then shifts back to plaintiff to prove that
the articulated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.64
Finally, if plaintiff proves that an employer's facially neutral and perhaps
benignly motivated policy disproportionately and adversely affects a protected
class, the employer must show that the policy is justified as a business neces-
sity.65 This is a judicially created defense designed especially for cases of dis-
parate impact.66 Some courts have held that the plaintiff may defeat a
defendant's business necessity defense by proving that the employer could
have adopted other policies that would have achieved the same business pur-
pose with a less burdensome effect on the protected class. 67 Others have
placed the burden on the plaintiff to suggest alternatives, after which the de-
fendant must persuade the court why the suggested policies are not feasible.68
The bfoq and the business necessity defenses have been construed and
applied in varying fashions.69 Several tests have evolved for evaluating the
bfoq defense in the area of sex discrimination.70 However the tests are articu-
lated, it is well established that the bfoq defense is an extremely narrow excep-
tion in cases of overt sex discrimination.71 The most often cited formulations
of the bfoq defense in the area of sex discrimination originated in three court
of appeals cases.
59. See Williams, supra note 4, at 672-73. See also infra notes 164-69 & 174-76 and accom-
panying text.
60. See infra notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
61. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
62. The defendant's burden of rebuttal is much less demanding in cases of covert disparate
treatment than in cases of disparate impact. See Note, Good Faith as a Defense in Title VII Ac-
tions--Stouer v. Marsh, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 301 (1983).
63. See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
64. Id.
65. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1977).
66. Id. Griggs was the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized the disparate impact
theory and the business necessity defense.
67. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
68. See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 270 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Crockett v.
Green, 388 F. Supp. 912, 920 (E.D. Wis. 1975), af'd, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976).
69. See generally Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Di-
lemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOwA L.
REv. 63, 89-98 (1980).
70. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
71. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.19 (1977). See also EEOC Guidelines on
Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 2(a) (1980) ("The Commission believes that the bona fide
occupational qualification as to sex should be interpreted narrowly.").
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In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacfc Co. 72 and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. 73 the courts considered employer policies excluding
women from positions involving strenuous physical activities. 74 Relying on
state protective statutes limiting the amount of weight women were allowed to
lift on the job, the employers claimed that being male was a bfoq for these
positions. 75 Both courts rejected the common stereotype of women as the
weaker sex as a proper basis for establishing a bfoq,76 but they adopted differ-
ent standards for what would properly constitute a bfoq. In Rosenfeld the
court stated that "sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might,
to one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis for
the application of the BFOQ exception. '77 These sexual characteristics must
be "crucial to the successful performance of the job, as they would be for the
position of a wet nurse."78
The test adopted by the Weeks court is not as strict. That court stated
that "to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an em-
ployer has the burden of proving that he has reasonable cause to believe, that
is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and effectively the duties of the job. ' 79 The court
noted in dicta that the employer may establish a bfoq if it can show that it is
"impossible to deal with women [or any protected class] on an individualized
basis."' 80 The Weeks test enables employers to exclude women who are able to
perform since they are merely exceptions to the rule.8 '
The court in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways8 2 rejected the em-
ployer's argument that males should not be hired as flight attendants because
men generally do not possess typically female abilities in certain nonmechani-
cal aspects of the job, such as giving courteous personalized service. 83 The
court stated that "discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of
72. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
73. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1223; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 231-32.
75. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1224; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 232-33.
76. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1224; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235-36. Employer policies purporting to
protect women have not fared well under Title VII. The Weeks court stated the following:
Title VII rejects ... romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead vest[s] indi-
vidual women with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks.
Men have always had the right to determine whether the incremetal increase in remuner-
ation for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring, or unromantic tasks is worth the can-
dle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on an equal footing. We
cannot conclude that by including the bona fide occupational qualification exception
Congress intended to renege on that promise.
Id. at 236. See also Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
("personal risk decisions not affecting business operations are best left to individuals who are the
targets of discrimination"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
77. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1225.
78. Id. at 1224.
79. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
80. Id. at 235 n.5.
81. See Furnish, supra note 69, at 91-92.
82. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
83. Id. at 387.
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the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one
sex exclusively." 84 The court concluded that to find a bfoq exception to sex
discrimination, "it must not only be shown that it is impracticable to find the
men that possess the abilities that most women possess, but that the abilities
are necessary to the business, not merely tangential."8 5
Although it did not articulate a specific test, the Supreme Court in
Dothard v. Rawlinson86 considered elements from both Weeks and Diaz when
assessing a state regulation prohibiting women from working in "contact posi-
tions" in a male maximum security prison.87 Since twenty percent of the pris-
oners were sex offenders who were scattered throughout the prison,88 the
Court found that there was a "basis in fact" for believing that a female correc-
tional counselor's "very womanhood" would increase the likelihood that she
would be assaulted.8 9 Because such an assault would threaten not only the
female employee, but also the control of the prison and the safety of the other
prisoners and security personnel, the Court held that a female's sex would
"directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a
correctional counselor's responsibility." 90 Thus, being a male was a bfoq.9'
Despite the different formulations, the foregoing tests for the bfoq defense
have a common thread: the employer must be able to prove a nexus between
sex and the individual's ability to perform the essential duties of the job to
justify its policy of explicit discrimination as a bfoq.92
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 93 the Supreme Court first defined the busi-
ness necessity test within the narrow context of pre-employment testing and
high school completion requirements. The employer's policy, though appar-
ently adopted without discriminatory intent,94 excluded many more blacks
84. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 388-89 (emphasis in original).
86. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
87. Id at 325, 333.
88. Id. at 335.
89. Id. at 335-36.
90. Id. at 336.
91. Courts have been more willing to find a bfoq when the safety of others is concerned. It
should be noted, however, that preventing harm to third parties must be an integral part of the
em loyee's job responsibilities. See, e.g., Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176, 1176
(4t Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (nonpregnancy is bfoq for flight attendants since pregnancy could
interfere with duty to protect passengers), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976) (Age is bfoq for bus drivers since slower
reflexes of older drivers might endanger passenger safety: "The greater the safety factor, mea-
sured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an accident, the
more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to insure safe driving.").
92. See Furnish, supra note 69, at 92.
93. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
94. The employer's vice-president stated that the testing and diploma requirements were
adopted to "improve the overall quality of the work force." Id. at 431. These requirements ap-
plied to positions in all of the plant's five operating departments except the labor department. The
jobs in these departments traditionally had been filled only by whites; blacks were restricted to the
labor department until 1965, when the testing and diploma requirements went into effect for both
initial admission into the other departments as well as transfer into the other departments from
labor. Id. at 427-28.
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than whites and thus established a prima facie case of disparate impact.95 The
Court found that to justify such a policy the employer must show that the
policy is "related to job performance, '96 that it "bear[s] a demonstrable rela-
tionship to successful performance of the job for which it was used,"'97 and
that it has "a manifest relationship to the employment in question. ' 98 The
Court stated that when assessing the policy under Title VII, the "touchstone is
business necessity." 99
In Robinson v. Lorillardl°° the Fourth Circuit applied an alternative to
the "job-relatedness" means of proving that a facially neutral policy with dis-
parate impact should be justified as a business necessity:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business pur-
pose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient opera-
tion of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently
compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice
must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve;
and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or
practices which would better accomplish the business purpose ad-
vanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial
impact. 101
In Robinson the employer argued in part that its acceptance of the union-im-
posed seniority system that was the source of the disparate impact was a busi-
ness necessity because refusing to accept the system could have resulted in a
strike and consequential economic loss.' 02 The court found that considera-
tions of economy and efficiency may help establish the existence of a business
necessity, but that'avoidance of cost alone could not justify a policy challenged
under the disparate impact theory as a business necessity.' 0 3
The Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson 104 rejected the Alabama
prison system's contention that, because strength was necessary for successful
job performance, the minimum height and weight requirements for correc-
95. Id. at 429.
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 432.
99. Id. at 431.
100. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
101. Id. at 798. Supreme Court decisions since the Fourth Circuit's decision in Robinson have
placed the burden of proving the existence of less discriminatory alternatives on the plaintiff as a
rebuttal to the employer's business necessity defense. See supra note 67.
102. Id. at 799.
103. Id. at 799 n.8. Cf. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17
(1975) (cost argument in defending discriminatory policy could not prevail since Title VII con-
tains no cost justification defense and no court has recognized such defense under Title VII). See
also Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 259, 264 (N.D. Ala. 1982), (the court declined
to recognize the avoidance of potential liability to a fetus damaged by exposure to X-rays as a
business purpose necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business because such a justi-
fication for a policy excluding pregnant employees would shift the focus of business necessity from
a concern about the health of hospital patients to a concern about hospital finances), af'd, 726
F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1984); EEOC Decision No. 72-1292, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 845, 845
(1972) (financial expense not a business necessity).
104. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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tional counselors were job-related and thus justified as a business necessity
despite their disparate impact on women.'05 The Court explicitly adopted the
Griggs standard that the employer must show a manifest relationship between
its requirements and the employment in question.10 6 In addition, the Court
stated in language similar to that found in Robinson that an employment pol-
icy with a discriminatory impact will survive attack under Title VII only if it is
"necessary to safe and efficient job performance."' 1 7 Since the employer gave
no evidence correlating the height and weight requirements and the level of
strength necessary for successful job performance,108 the Court found that a
strength test would achieve the business goal more effectively and with a less
discriminatory impact on women.' 0 9
Although the success of the employers' business defenses in Griggs and
Dothard turned on whether the employers' policies were significantly related
to the employees' successful performance of particular jobs," 0 ability to per-
form a job is only one of many legitimate business purposes that is "necessary
to the safe and efficient operation of [a] business.'' 1 Thus, to the extent that
the business necessity defense is not limited to the narrow concept of "occupa-
tional qualifications" as they relate to an individual employee's ability to per-
form a job, the business necessity defense is easier to establish than the bfoq
defense." 212
To determine whether the Fourth Circuit placed Olin's exclusionary pol-
icy into the proper Title VII analytic framework, it is necessary to understand
the history of pregnancy-based discrimination under Title VII. In General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert" 3 the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of preg-
105. Id. at 331.
106. Id. at 329.
107. Id. at 332 n.14. Whenever the safety of third parties is involved, courts traditionally have
been more receptive to the employer's asserted business necessity defenses. See, e.g., New York
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (recognizing special responsibility for
public safety borne by transit authority employees, Court held exclusion of methadone users from
jobs requiring maximum alertness and competence sufficiently "job-related" to be business neces-
sity); Spurlock v. United Air Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972) (court accepted exclu-
sion of noncollege graduates from positions as airline pilots; "when the job clearly requires a high
degree of skill and the. . . human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the
employer bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show that his employment criteria are job-
related").
108. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331.
109. Id. at 332. Although it is not apparent whether plaintiff in Dothard presented this less
discriminatory alternative, or whether the Court took judicial notice of it in deciding that the
requirement was not an absolute business necessity, the Court did state earlier in its opinion in
dicta that plaintiff could rebut the employer's showing of business necessity by showing less bur-
densome alternatives. Id. at 329. This is a distinct departure from the Robinson approach of
placing the burden of proving the absence of less discriminatory alternatives on the employer.
110. See supra notes 96-98, 105 & 107 and accompanying text.
11. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
112. See Williams, supra note 4, at 672-73.
113. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Gilbert involved a class action charging that the employer's disabil-
ity plan violated Title VII by excluding pregnancy from its otherwise comprehensive coverage of
nonoccupational sicknesses and accidents. Id at 128-29. Before the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gilbert, the lower federal courts had consistently struck down policies adversely affecting women
because of pregnancy or a related condition, equating pregnancy-based differentiation with overt
gender-based discrimination. See Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1213
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nancy from the employer's disability benefits program "is not a gender-based
discrimination at all."" 4 The Supreme Court reasoned that the exclusion was
based neutrally on the nature of a physical disability rather than on the em-
ployee's sex.'1 Nor did the Court find a disparate impact on women since the
program benefited male and female employees equally." t6 The Court noted
that a policy based on pregnancy could be challenged as a pretext for sex dis-
crimJination, 17 but that the mere existence of such a policy did not give rise
automatically to an inference of pretext." 8
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty' 19 the Supreme Court reiterated its holding
in Gilbert that an employer's policy that differentiates on the basis of preg-
nancy "is not on its face a discriminatory policy.' 120 The employer in Salty
required pregnant workers to take an unpaid maternity leave 12' and stripped
those workers of any accrued seniority on return to work from the mandatory
maternity leave. 122 The Court regarded this policy as facially neutral,' 23 and
thus analyzed it under the disparate impact theory.'2 4 It upheld the denial of
sick pay to pregnant workers on leave 25 while striking down the seniority
plan.'2 6 The Court distinguished the legality of the two policies on grounds
that the sick leave policy merely denied a benefit to women that men cannot
(9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 434 U.S. 158 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 853-54 (6th
Cir. 1975),modfedinpart, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d
961, 964 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977); Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 663 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Holthaus v.
Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1975); Communication Workers v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1028-31 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacatedon other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
These decisions were consistent with the EEOC guidelines on pregnancy-based discrimination. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1978).
114. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
115. Id. at 135. The Court's reasoning largely was based on its language in Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974), which involved a disability plan excluding pregnancy
from its coverage:
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides
potential recipients into two groups--pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.
116. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137-40. The Court stated that "pregnancy-related disabilities consti-
tute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not
destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from
the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks." Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 136.
118. Id. For further analyses of Gilbert, see Furnish, supra note 69, at 74-77 & 75 n.63; Note,
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 241-50 (1977).
119. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
120. Id. at 140.
121. Id. at 137. Although the employer did not extend sick pay to pregnant workers, it did
compensate employees for limited absences due to illnesses or disabilities that were not job-re-
lated. Id. at 143.
122. Id. at 140. Any employee who took a leave of absence for any other medical reason was
not divested of any accumulated seniority and actually continued accruing seniority while on
leave. Id.
123. Id. at 143-44.
124. Id. at 141-42, 144-45.
125. Id. at 145.
126. Id. at 143.
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receive and thus did not have a disparate impact on women, 127 whereas the
seniority plan imposed on women "a substantial burden that men need not
suffer ... in such a way as to deprive [women] of employment opportunities
because of their different role." 128 Since the employer presented no proof that
stripping pregnant workers of their seniority rights was a business necessity,
the seniority plan violated Title VII.129
Congress responded quickly to rectify the Supreme Court's treatment of
pregnancy-related policies as facially neutral rather than overtly discrimina-
tory by enacting the 1978 pregnancy amendment to Title VII.130 The purpose
of the amendment was "to clarify Congress' intent to include discrimination
based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions in the prohibi-
tion against sex discrimination in employment."' 13 1 Hence, the amendment
renders any policies based on or related to pregnancy "subject to the same
scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex discrimination proscribed in the
existing statute."'132
The legislative history clearly indicates that the amendment encompasses
discrimination based on the capacity to bear children as well as conditions
related to an existing pregnancy. In pointing out the need for the amendment,
Senator Williams, one of the bill's sponsors, stated that "the overall effect of
discrimination against women because they might become pregnant, or do be-
come pregnant, is to relegate women in general, and pregnant women in par-
ticular, to a second-class status with regard to career advancement and
continuity of employment and wages."' 133 He warned that the "shocking sta-
tistics" regarding the disparity between employment opportunities for men
and those for women "cannot be made better unless working women are pro-
127. Id. at 142, 145.
128. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 143. For further analysis of Sally, see Williams, supra note 4, at 676-77; Note, The
Demise of the Discriminatory Effect Analysis-Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 27 DEPAUL L. REV.
1301 (1978).
130. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V
1981)). The Act provides in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981).
131. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONri. & AD.
NEWS 4749, 4750.
132. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4752.
133. 123 CONG. REc. 29385 (1977) (emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1977) ("the assumption women will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at
the core of the sex stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the
workplace"); ProposedAmendment to Title VII to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Preg-
nancy, Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomna on Labor of the Sen. Comm on Human Resources,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1977) (statement of Ethel Bent Walsh, Vice Chairman, EEOC) ("There
can be no question that the wide range of employment policies directed at pregnant women--or at
all women because they might become pregnant-constitute one of the most significant hin-
drances to women's equal participation in the labor market.") [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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vided effective protection against discrimination on the basis of their
childbearing capacity."' 34 Senator Clark explained that he was cosponsoring
the amendment "because it is clear to me that discriminating against women
on the narrow basis of their capacity to become pregnant is not consistent with
the goals set forth in the Civil Rights Act." 135 The House Report accompany-
ing the amendment states that the bill's protection is meant to extend to "the
whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process"; 136 maintaining
the ability to become pregnant certainly is critical to that process. 137 The Sen-
ate Report recognizes the following passages from the dissenting opinions in
Gilbert as "correctly express[ing] both the principle and the meaning of Title
VII."'1 38 Justice Stevens stated that "[bly definition,. . . a [pregnancy-related]
rule discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant
which primarily differentiates the female from the male."' 39 Likewise, Justice
Brennan stated that "it offends commonsense to suggest. . . that a classifica-
tion revolving around pregnancy is not at the minimum strongly 'sex-re-
lated.' "140 The Senate Report notes that the amendment was introduced to
reflect the "commonsense" view and to guarantee working women protection
from all forms of discrimination based on sex. 14' Since a classification of ap-
plicants or employees according to their capacity to bear children undoubtedly
revolves around pregnancy and hence sex, it clearly falls within the scope of
the amendment and Title VII's ban on gender-based discrimination.
In Harriss v. Pan American World Airways 142 the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that the 1978 amendment mandated this change in the analytic frame-
work for pregnancy-based discrimination. In Harriss the employer had
enforced a mandatory maternity leave both before and after Congress' amend-
ment of the statute.143 The court stated that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Gilbert applied to the employer's enforcement of the policy prior to the
amendment;144 hence for that period the court treated the policy as gender-
neutral, assessing the claim under disparate impact theory and the employer's
justification for the policy in terms of the business necessity defense. t45 After
the amendment, however, the policy constituted per se sex discrimination;' 4 6
134. 123 CONG. REc. 29385 (1977).
135. Hearings, supra note 133, at 393.
136. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4749, 4750.
137. See Note, supra note 3, at 144.
138. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
139. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-3 (1977).
140. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977).
141. Id.
142. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
143. Id. at 673. The policy required female flight attendants to go on maternity leave immedi-
ately upon knowledge of pregnancy and to remain on leave until sixty days after birth. Id.
144. Id. at 674.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 676.
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hence, the employer's justification for the policy during that period had to be
evaluated in terms of the bfoq defense.' 47
Unlike the Harriss court, in determining the appropriate Title VII theory
for analysis of the pregnancy-related fetal vulnerability program, the Olin
court either did not understand Congress' intention in the pregnancy amend-
ment or chose to ignore it. The Olin court rejected as "conceptually unsound"
plaintiff's contention that the disparate impact-business necessity theory
should apply to Olin's fetal vulnerability program for the period prior to the
amendment, and the overt discrimination-bfoq theory for the period follow-
ing.148 Instead, the Olin court relied on the Supreme Court's pre-amendment
opinion in the "generally comparable situation' 149 in Safty' 50 to hold that
Olin's policy was gender-neutral and that the disparate impact theory should
be applied "unhesitatingly."''
Had the Olin court followed Congress' mandate that pregnancy-related
discrimination be treated the same as other forms of sex discrimination, and
accordingly applied the overt discrimination-bfoq theory to Olin's policy, the
plaintiff would have prevailed. The exclusion of fertile women to protect fetal
health cannot possibly be justified under the narrow tests devised under the
bfoq defense to sex discrimination;152 harm to a fetus has no bearing on an
employee's ability to perform her job. 153 Apparently, the court was unwilling
to accept an automatic ban on such policies, for it engaged in analytical gym-
nastics to attempt to fit the claim into disparate impact theory.
The Olin court correctly noted that the disparate impact theory was
designed to apply to facially neutral employment practices that fall more
harshly on one group than another.154 It nonetheless attempted to place Olin's
policy within the disparate impact theory by focusing exclusively on the pol-
147. Id. The court noted that the two defenses must be applied distinctly. Id
148. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1183-84 n.17 (4th Cir. 1982).
149. Id. at 1186. The court found that Olin's policy was similar to the seniority plan in Salty,
see supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text, because the "facial neutrality [of the policies] was
only superficial in view of the palpable correlation between the gender of employees and [their]
manifest consequences," id. at 1186, and that each of the policies, "though literally expressed in
gender-neutral terms, has as its obvious and indisputable intended consequence the imposing
upon women workers of a 'substantial burden that men need not suffer."' Id. (quoting Salty, 434
U.S. at 142).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 119-129.
151. 697 F.2d at 1186. This position is inconsistent with the legislative intent apparent in the
following passage in the House Report accompanying the pregnancy amendment: "By making
clear that distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII, the bill would elimi-
nate the need in most instances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate the diffi-
culties in applying the distinctions created in Salty." H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4751.
152. See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
153. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 259, 264 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (potential for
fetal harm that does not affect adversely a mother's job performance is irrelevant to bfoq issue),
af'd, 726 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984); see also Maclennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp.
466, 471 (E.D. Va. 1977) (threat of inflight abortion relevant to bfoq only if it affects job perform-
ance of flight attendant); In re National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 262 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (fetal
harm not relevant to bfoq issue), a f'dper curiam, 700 F.2d 695 (1lth Cir. 1983).
154. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1186.
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icy's impact on the employment rights of women.15 5 It justified its approach
by stating that the theory "has as its critical feature the consequences of em-
ployment policies rather than the 'neutrality' with which the policies happen to
be formally expressed."' 156 The court's focus, however, was misplaced.
Whether the court had chosen to characterize Olin's policy as overtly discrimi-
natory or facially neutral, it would have had the inevitable feature of adversely
affecting women. Hence, focusing on the consequences of the policy is mean-
ingless unless it is preceded by an evaluation of the policy itself. If the policy
classifies employees according to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it
violates Title VII without regard to its actual consequences. 15 7 On the other
hand, if the policy is based on neutral criteria, it does not violate Title VII
unless it is discriminatory in operation. Thus, while proof of disproportionate
adverse consequences is indispensable to establishing a prima facie case of
disparate impact,' 58 such proof is necessary only if the disputed policy is
facially neutral. Olin's policy was clearly not facially neutral; indeed, it fell
within Title VII's ban by classifying applicants on the basis of their ability to
become pregnant. 159 By focusing exclusively on the inevitable consequences
of Olin's policy in applying the disparate impact theory, the Olin court opened
the door for courts to assess any policy that explicitly discriminates on a pro-
scribed basis under either the overt discrimination-bfoq theory or the dispa-
rate impact-business necessity theory.
This approach might be followed by courts who wish to provide employ-
ers with the wider scope of the business necessity defense but feel constrained
to apply that defense only to claims of disparate impact. Despite its own ex-
treme efforts to fit the fetal vulnerability claim into the disparate impact-busi-
ness necessity theory, the Olin court nonetheless indicated in dictum that it
would have allowed the business necessity defense even if it had characterized
Olin's policy as overt discrimination. 160 The court considered the use of the
bfoq defense in cases of overt discrimination to be merely an employer's spe-
cific litigation choice and not a reflection of "any inherent constraints in Title
VII doctrine."''
The court's position that the business necessity defense may be available
in cases of overt discrimination is disconcerting for several reasons. First,
Congress created the statutory bfoq defense as "a limited right to discriminate
on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin where the reason for the dis-
crimination is a bona fide occupational qualification."'16 2 Noticeably absent
155. See id.
156. Id. The court characterized any dispute over the facial neutrality of Olin's policy as
"mere semantic quibbling having no relevance to the underlying substantive principle that gave
rise to [the disparate impact] theory." Id.
157. See supra notes 48-50 & accompanying text; infra note 174.
158. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 53, at 1326.
159. See supra notes 130-141 and accompanying text.
160. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1185-86 n.21.
161. Id.
162. Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII, 110 CONo. REc. 7213 (1964) (remarks of Sens.
Clark and Case).
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from the exception is the right to discriminate on the basis of race. Hence,
should the Olin court's dictum be interpreted to encompass overt discrimina-
tion in general, a court could contradict Congress' unwillingness to allow an
affirmative defense to deliberate discriminatory treatment based on race 163 by
permitting an employer guilty of overt racial discrimination to respond with a
business necessity defense.
Second, the legislative history to Title VII and the pregnancy amendment
indicate that the bfoq defense should be the only defense to classification of
jobs on the basis of sex. In the legislative history to the original bill it was
stated that "under Title VII, jobs can no longer be classified as to sex except
where there is a rational basis for discrimination on the grounds ofbonafide
occupational qualocations."'64 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in Burwell v. East-
ern .4irlines165 stated that "[iln sex discrimination cases, . . . clear disparate
treatment will be tested by a BFOQ defense."' 166 The pregnancy amendment
also reinforced the conclusion that the ability to do the necessary work is the
required standard in an employer's treatment of different classes. 167 Allowing
class-based distinctions only when they are an occupational qualification nec-
essary to perform the job in question is the essence of the bfoq defense.1 68 In
contrast, ability to perform is only one possible business purpose that may be
raised to establish a business necessity. 169 Hence, allowing a defense under
the wider scope of the business necessity theory would again undermine con-
gressional intent.
Third, the business necessity defense originally was designed as the
proper response to the judicially created claim of disparate impact. 170 Unlike
policies that overtly discriminate, policies that give rise to claims of disparate
impact are "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."' 71 Such policies
conceivably may be of two types: (1) neutral, good faith policies designed
without regard to possible discriminatory effects, ' 72 and (2) policies that reflect
subtle attempts by employers to evade Title VII by imposing neutral require-
ments while knowing of their inevitably discriminatory consequences.1 73
163. See Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980) (omission of race from
bfoq was intentional because Congress did not view race as a qualification that could be reason-
ably necessary to the efficient operation of any business), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 273
(1983); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 1005 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (same),
rep'd on other grounds, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
164. 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964) (emphasis added).
165. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
166. Id. at 370 (dictum).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981); supra note 130. The House Report states that
women subject to the amendment must "be treated the same as other employees on the basis of
their ability or inability to work." H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4752.
168. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
170. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
171. Id. at 424.
172. Id. at 430.
173. This may have been the case in Griggs. The employer overtly discriminated against
blacks until July 2, 1965, the date on which Title VII became effective. Id. at 427. On that date
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While disparate impact and overt discrimination are both violations of Title
VII, there is no doubt that an employer with an overtly discriminatory policy
intended to violate the ban on discrimination. In contrast, an employer guilty
of disparate impact might have been cognizant of his duties under the statute
even though his policy ran afoul of it. In such a case, the act is perhaps not so
invidious as the blatant act of the employer who overtly discriminates. Since
an employer may not be able to foresee the discriminatory effects of a facially
neutral business policy, a wider scope ofjustifications, even for policies with a
racial impact, is warranted. The same cannot be said when an employer delib-
erately violates the statute-such an act does not warrant the benefit of the
broader business necessity defense.
Finally, by enacting Title VII, Congress made the judgment that race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin are the "five forbidden criteria" for
making employment decisions. 174 In cases of disparate impact, the policies
are not based on these forbidden criteria; since the criteria are legitimate under
the statute, the employer should be given broader leeway in the pursuit of his
legitimate business purposes. The business necessity defense reflects the need
to prevent non-job-related criteria from hampering equal employment oppor-
tunities while respecting the "employer's right to insist that any prospective
applicant. . . must meet the applicable job qualifications" when those qualifi-
cations are based on legitimate criteria.' 7 5 In contrast, policies that overtly
discriminate are never based on legitimate criteria. Regardless of whether
other business interests are served by making distinctions on the basis of the
"five forbidden criteria," Congress made the further judgment that the only
time an employer may use sex, national origin, or religion as a selection crite-
rion is when it is a bfoq.17 6 Hence, extending the business necessity defense to
overt discrimination would create a wider license to use class-based criteria for
making employment decisions than Congress intended, thereby allowing em-
ployers to second-guess Congress about when sex or other forbidden criteria
may be used to promote the employer's business goals.
The court's analysis would have been proper had the court merely been
the employer instituted its testing and high school diploma requirement, 1d. at 431-32, which oper-
ated to have as significant an adverse impact on blacks as did the employer's overtly discrimina-
tory policy. Id. at 430.
174. In their Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII, Senators Case and Clark-floor man-
agers of the bill--stated that "those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are
prohibited by [Title VII] are those which are based on the five forbidden criteria: race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. Any other criteria or qualification for employment is not af-
fected by this title." 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
175. Id. at 7247.
176. Indeed, the defeat of an amendment that would have allowed an employer to hire or
refuse to hire an individual because of the individual's race, color, religion, or national origin
when hiring the individual would benefit the business or "the good will thereof" clearly indicates
that Congress meant to limit an employer's justification for overt discrimination to bfoq. Id. at
13825. The Senate defeated the amendment by a vote of 60 to 31. Id. at 13826. Senator McClel-
lan had introduced the amendment to protect the "employer's right to exercise his judgment in his
own business affairs." Id. at 13825. Senator Case urged defeat of the amendment because in
effect it "would destroy [Title VII]" Id.
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determining the pre-amendment legality of the program. 177 Since other pre-
amendment exclusionary policies or truly neutral exclusionary policies 178 may
be presented to courts, and since the Olin court indicated that it would con-
sider a business necessity defense even if the policy were established to be
overtly discriminatory, it is important to determine whether the Olin court's
application of the business necessity defense was conceptually sound.
The major obstacle to establishing the business necessity defense in this
context is the requirement that the defendant show an "overriding legitimate
business purpose"'179 for the challenged practice. The Olin court's characteri-
zation of the safety of fetuses as "no less a matter of legitimate business con-
cern than the safety of the traditional business licensee or invitee upon the
employer's premises"'180 is debatable. Business licensees and invitees are in-
volved directly in the operation of a business, and thus it is justifiably in the
employer's business interest to ensure their safety, even though a conffict with
the employment rights of another party may result.18 ' In contrast, fetuses
have nothing to do with operating a business; thus, the only apparent basis for
the employer's paternalistic desire to protect fetuses is the societal concern for
the health of future generations. 182
Extending the business necessity defense beyond traditional employer
policies relating to the operation of a business, to policies relating only to soci-
ety's best interest, may allow an employer to avoid compliance with Title VII
on the basis of its perception of the public interest.' 8 3 Determining which
societal goals override compliance with established laws should be a function
of the legislature, not of the business sector.' 84 Thus, by stating that "a gen-
eral basis for the 'business necessity' asserted [in Olin] need [not] be sought in
177. The pregnancy amendment does not apply retroactively. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4756.
178. An example of a neutral exclusionary policy is one that excludes workers according to
their susceptibility to reproductive hazards. Since both men and women may be subject to such
hazards, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text, the policy would be considered gender-
neutral.
179. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971) (emphasis added).
180. 697 F.2d at 1189.
181. See supra note 107.
182. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
183. See Note, Birth Defects Caused by Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Inter-
face of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237, 257-58 (1979). Olin's
perception of the public's interest completely disregards the countervailing societal interest in re-
serving to individuals the right to make childbearing decisions without coercion by third parties.
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."). Reported instances show that an employer's requirement of infertility for employment in
fetally toxic work environments has caused some women to seek sterilization out of economic
necessity for keeping their jobs. See, e.g., Bronson, Issue of Fetal Damage Stirs Women Workers at
Chemical Plant, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 1 (five women employees at American Cyana-
mid Company underwent sterilization when faced with choice between job and fertility). Thus,
exclusionary policies conceivably could be deemed economic coercion to relinquish the right to
decide to bear a child.
184. See Note, supra note 183, at 257-58.
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other considerations than the general societal interest,"' 85 the Olin court set a
dangerous precedent for expansion of the business necessity defense to con-
texts unrelated to traditional business concerns.
Avoidance of potentially astronomical tort liability to a damaged fetus
through an exclusionary policy is a more valid basis for establishing a legiti-
mate business purpose.18 6 Since children who suffer harm through prenatal
exposure at the workplace are not limited to recovery under worker's compen-
sation laws, 187 and since a female worker may not waive a cause of action
belonging to her child,' 88 an employer reasonably may believe that resorting
to an exclusionary policy is the only dependable means of protecting the prof-
itability or perhaps even the solvency of its enterprise. Nonetheless, the em-
ployer must be able to prove that the necessity of protecting itself from tort
liability is "sufficiently 'compelling' to 'override' conflicting private interests
protected by Title VII."189 Courts consistently have been unwilling to accept
avoidance of financial burden alone as a sufficiently compelling defense to
discriminatory policies, 190 and have required the employer to bear the costs
incidental to remedying discrimination.'19 Some courts, however, apparently
have left open the possibility of such a defense when the financial impact of
eliminating a policy substantially outweighs the discriminatory impact of the
policy. 192
185. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190 n.26.
186. See Note, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1113,
1131 (1977). See also Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982)(dictum) ("Although concern over fetal health alone is arguably not the province of the employer,
but of the mother, the economic consequences of a tort suit brought against the hospital by a
congenitally malformed child could be financially devastating, seriously disrupting the 'safe and
efficient operation of the business.' ") (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
187. 1 J. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10(c), (e) (1982) (coverage limited
to persons having status of employee who suffers work-related injuries; dependents and spouses
subject to Act only when recovering for work-related death of employee-parent or -spouse). See
Wiliams, supra note 4, at 645-46 & n.23.
188. See Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 191, 141 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1965) (parent cannot bind
minor child by signing covenant not to sue); Cumberland County Welfare Bd. v. Rodriquez, 144
N.J. Super. 365, 378-79, 365 A.2d 723, 730-31 (1976) (parent has no authority to waive, release, or
compromise claims or causes of action of child).
189. Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190 n.26 (citing Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
190. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 &
nn.31-32 (1978) (neither Congress nor the courts have recognized a cost justification defense under
Title VII; pension plan costs not a sufficient basis for establishing business necessity defense);
Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 1975) (administrative
costs that might justify an employment practice for purposes of equal protection would not neces-
sarily be an adequate defense under Title VII), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037(1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.) ("[w]hile considerations of
economy and efficiency will often be relevant to determining the existence of business necessity,
dollar cost alone is not determinative"), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
191. See United States v. N. L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 366 & n.l 1 (8th Cir. 1973) (addi-
tional training costs accompanying prevention of employment discrimination must be borne by
employer); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Iowa 1975)("for women to have the equal employment opportunities ... intended by the enactment of Title
VII, employers ... must accept as a cost of production whatever increases in sick leave program
costs... will ensue by including pregnancy as a disability").
192. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975) (implying that court
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Although the elimination of an exclusionary policy would not impose au-
tomatically an onerous financial burden on an employer, the employer might
be able to establish that the need for the policy is sufficiently compelling to
outweigh its discriminatory impact if the likelihood of the feared tort liability
is great' 93 and if the relationship between liability and the employer's ongoing
profitability is clear.'9 4 The burden of meeting such a balancing test is likely
to be great for several reasons. The availability of birth control and abortion
may lessen the risk that a fetus who could be exposed to a toxic environment
will be conceived or carried to term, hence reducing the likelihood of any
employer liability.' 95 Even if the employer were sued by a child who had
suffered prenatal harm, if a negligence theory rather than a strict liability the-
ory 196 were imposed, a mother's voluntary and informed decision to work in a
necessarily hazardous environment would seem to indicate an absence of em-
ployer negligence or may be considered a superseding cause insulating the
employer from liability. 197 Also, showing a causal relationship between the
mother's exposure and the child's birth defect in a negligence case could prove
to be scientifically difficult. 198 Concerning the relationship between liability
and the ongoing profitability of the business, the availability of insurance
against the risk of liability to damaged children could reduce significantly the
financial impact of potential suits. 199 Hence, even though fear of tort liability
is a valid business concern, that fear may not be sufficiently compelling to
override the interests of fertile women protected by Title VII.
Another obstacle to establishing a business necessity defense for a policy
might have considered cost a defense if employer had presented statistical information showing
that increased cost for pregnancy benefits would be "devastating"), vacated on other grounds, 424
U.S. 737 (1976); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1971) (employer failed
to establish business necessity defense since costs of training replacements for black transferees
not substantial enough to outweigh the detriment of locking members of protected class into infer-
ior positions). Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1982) (employer may avoid charge of discrimination against
the handicapped by demonstrating that costs of accomodating limitations of handicapped em-
ployee or applicant would impose an "undue hardship"). See generally Note, Developments in the
Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv.
1109, 1150 (1971) ("[Clostliness does become significant in extreme circumstances. A remedy
should not be imposed which threatens a business with extinction.").
193. See Williams, supra note 4, at 646.
194. See Howard, supra note 2, at 832.
195. Probabilities indicate that fetuses of women workers in industries adopting exclusionary
policies represent only "a minuscule source of potential liability." Bertin, Workplace Bias Takes
the Form of "'Fetal Protectionism," Legal Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at 18, col. 1.
196. See Williams, supra note 4, at 646 n.25, 657 & n.106 (birth defect of developmental disa-
bility may be caused in a number of ways, e.g., direct exposure of mother; mother's exposure
through male worker carrying toxic substance on clothes or hair; exposure of fetus through vagi-
nal absorption of toxic substances in seminal fluid of exposed male worker; and spontaneous
occurrence of genetic error). See also Crowell & Copus, Safety and Equality at Odds: OSHA and
Title VII Clash over Health Hazards in the Workplace, 2 IND. REL. L.J. 567, 588 (1978).
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAw OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (one conducting an abnor-
mally dangerous activity is liable for harm resulting from that activity even if he exercised utmost
care to prevent harm).
198. See Crowell & Copus, supra note 196, at 588.
199. See Williams, supra note 4, at 646 n.25 (if work-related suits for prenatal damage should
become financially onerous for industry, legislatures are likely to respond by enacting laws, simi-
lar to worker's compensation laws, limiting liability); Note, supra note 183, at 257.
1984] 1089
NORTH CAROLINA LA4 REVIEW[
that results in the exclusion of fertile women is the requirement embraced by
the Olin court that the policy "effectively carry out the business purpose it is
alleged to serve."2 00 The employer may encounter two problems in proving
the effectiveness of the exclusionary policy. First, if the policy applies only to
fertile women, it may not include all classes necessary to achieve its pur-
pose.20 1 If fetal damage may occur through paternal as well as maternal expo-
sure, the exclusion of only women neither maximizes the protection of fetuses
nor eliminates the risk of employer liability.20 2 Second, if the policy applies to
all women of childbearing capacity, the policy may include more women than
is necessary to achieve its purpose.20 3 The class adversely affected not only
includes those women who actually present a risk (le., those who might be-
come pregnant and would give birth) but also the larger percentage of women
who do not need protection from exposure (i e., those who, because of chance
or design, would not become pregnant or who would not carry the pregnancy
to term).2° 4 Hence, even though the Olin court weakened the traditional Title
VII business necessity defense by recognizing the societal concern for fetal
health as a legitimate business purpose, it at least prevents "casual resort" to
broad exclusionary policies by requiring that the policies be narrowly tailored
to the hazard contemplated.2 05
The exclusionary policy in Olin clearly constituted overt discrimination,
and hence the business necessity defense should not even have been consid-
ered by the court. Since no bfoq for the policy could have been shown, the
court should have struck down the policy as violating Title VII without further
analysis. Although the Olin court's concern over fetal health is commendable,
its manipulation of existing Title VII analysis to avoid an automatic ban on
exclusionary policies reveals that the court did not recognize the potential for
abuse of the Title VII theories of claims and defenses in other contexts not
related to business. It blatantly ignored the congressional mandate in the
pregnancy amendment to treat pregnancy-related discrimination as overt sex
discrimination. Although society's interest in future generations is a valid con-
cem, it is improper for courts to allow employers to use social policies rather
than business purposes to excuse violations of the policy to eliminate employ-
ment discrimination. Instead, when such important social policies conflict,
resolution is best left to Congress.
DIANE SANDERS PEAKE
200. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
201. See Williams, supra note 4, at 695-96.
202. See Note, supra note 186, at 1133.
203. See Williams, supra note 4, at 695-96.
204. Id. at 696 & n.314. It has been estimated that less than nine percent of all working
women are pregnant in any given year. Id See also Note, supra note 186, at 1134.
205. See Bertin, supra note 195, at 20, col. 3.
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